greed by offering a fair share of c instead of C-.' For players X with c = c this is impossible. Since Z was not informed about the offer x, no responding player knew the available amount, unless it was revealed by the offer. One might expect to observe a wide range of behaviour by players Z, but we observed clearcut behaviour by players Z: there is an acceptance threshold for Z below which any offer is rejected and above which any offer is accepted.
Although our classroom experiments were repeated once, this does not provide enough opportunity for learning. As part of a broader research project2 we wanted to explore whether certain forms of decision preparation can induce a more mature behaviour and thereby substitute learning by repetitive play. One form of decision preparation was a pre-experimental questionnaire designed to induce consideration of backward induction, the other was to auction player positions instead of allocating them by chance. Of course, auctioning the positions of two-level ultimatum games is likely not only to trigger a more thorough analysis of the decision problem, but also to engender feelings of entitlement and alter perceptions of fairness (Gtith and Tietz, I 986). Naturally we were not only interested in the actual plays after auctioning positions, but also in the bids themselves which can be interpreted as a prioripayoff expectations for the various player positions.
Section I describes the experimental set-up in more detail. Section II states behavioural regularities, and Section III our essential conclusions.
I. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To avoid any misunderstanding we summarise the rules of two-level ultimatum games with players X, Y, and Z and the four subsequent decision stages: (i) Nature chooses c with probability 2 for c = = 24 6o and ' for c = c = I 2-6o (all amounts are in Deutsch mark, DM). While the two potential values of c and their probabilities are commonly known, only X learns which value of c has been chosen. Before describing how this game was experimentally implemented let us explain the 2 X 2-factorial design of decision preparation illustrated by Positions were auctioned by independent auctions for roles X, Y, and Z. All subjects, who could bid for only one position is {X, Y, ZI, had to submit a sealed bid. Four positions i were given to the four highest bidders at the price of the fifth highest bid for role i. Subjects were told that under such rules it is best to bid truthfully.
We first conducted a pilot experiment with 48 graduate students of economics who were unfamiliar with game theory where we relied on the preexperimental questionnaire for decision preparation (cell III in Table i ). For the main experiments students from all over the campus (University of Frankfurt am Main) were invited by posters (see Table 2 for the number of subjects, bids and plays where the number of plays in brackets indicates the number of plays in the repetition which do not qualify as independent observations).
One can describe the experimental procedure for all four cells of Table i by focusing on cell IV since all other cells just require that certain steps are omitted:
(a) All subjects meet in a large lecture room. They are randomly partitioned into three subgroups of equal size. These groups are led into three different lecture rooms where they receive their code numbers. (h) All subjects learn about their own play, i.e. about the true cake size, all offers and acceptances. Afterwards they have to fill out a post-experimental questionnaire (Appendix B). Then we announce the repetition and explain that nobody will meet the same partners.
(
i) Repetition of (d) to (h) where (d) was only repeated in cell III.
According to these rules the game is in the terminology of Mitzkewitz and Nagel (I993) an 'offer game'. Mitzkewitz and Nagal studied ultimatum games with six possible cake sizes (I, 2 ... , 6) and restricted offers to multiples of I. Offer games were also studied by Rapoport et al. (in press) who used a 'continuum' of cake sizes4 to study the effects of the amount of uncertainty. The main reason for us to use only two possible cake sizes is that we want to distinguish between the smallest possible offer and the fair share of the smallest possible cake.5 Furthermore, our design allows players to signal the true cake size without offering a fair share of it.
II. BEHAVIOURAL REGULARITIES
Before analysing the actual decision data it seems worthwhile to illustrate the game theoretic solution. We rely on two assumptions, namely that players are guided purely by monetary incentives and that any offer implying a zeropayoff will be rejected with probability I. Let c be the smallest money unit.
Since Z accepts every positive y (and rejects y = o), the optimal offer of Y is y* = c for all x > 26. Note that x = c implies a zero-payoff for player Y, since Thus, decisions within cells II and IV are not independent, since subjects interacted before the play in the auction. That explains why we will focus on bids. Announcing prices publicly may, however, enable, new fairness norms, e.g. the 'dividend standard' according to which people aim at equal dividends instead of equal absolute payoffs.
Of course, the usual indivisibilities of money do not allow a real continuum. In the experiment of Mitzkewitz and Nagal both amounts were equal, namely 
II. i. Proposers X
Imagine you are a player Y and are confronted with an offer x = 3C= 8&40. Does that not look like the offer of an X who -due to bad luck -got the small cake and wants to be extremely fair? At least, this possibility cannot be excluded. However, this also provides the chance for proposers X with c = e to imitate the fairness of the poor. As a matter of fact in the first round of all sessions7 9 out of I 5 X-players with c = c offered an x with 840e > x > 8&oo. If one neglects the auction experiments (cells II and IV), where due to role prices other fairness standards might be relevant, 7 out of io X-players with c = C chose an x which can be interpreted as pretending fairness, and two of the remaining three players chose an x with x >,I 2'6o signalling the large cake. In the repetition the frequency of pretending fairness actually increased to 8o0 0 (7 I 4 ?/ over all sessions of Table I Further anonymity by introducing incomplete information does not offset fairness considerations: proposers with large cakes still want to appear as fair.8 They might be greedy, but they want to avoid greed being verifiable. This motive is much more important than a real taste for equity in the sense of x = 2j which we could observe only once. A possible reason could be the fear that offers below 3G will be mostly rejected. Another reason might be that complying -at least superficially -with a (fairness) norm has some intrinsic value: you feel better when others do not know how greedy you are.9
Those players Xwith c = c who cannot hide their greed offer significantly less than the others. The hypothesis that of all plays with x < 3G the offer x for c = c is smaller than for c = c is highly significant (one-tailed MWU-test, first rounds only, n = I 7, a = o0ooo3). Actually only 2 out of 8 players with small cakes offered an x with 8-40 > x > 8-oo in the first rounds with the share even decreasing in the repetition (i of 9). We sum up these observations by f If one relaxes the assumption that offers yielding zero payoffs are rejected there are more perfect equilibria. 7 The data analysis in Section II is always based on the main experiments. However, the data of the pilot study confirm -as far as possible -the behavioural regularities, especially regularities I and 2.
S Note that Hoffman et al. introduced a zero-cake to avoid greed being verifiable. Subjects in their study received dollar bills in an envelope and then had to allocate the money. However, it was commonly known that one subject would receive strips of plain paper instead of money. This amounts in our notation to setting c = o, and, therefore, a o-offer in their study could be re-interpreted as an equal split with respect to the smallest possible cake.
9 To decide whether norm compliance in this weak sense is important a subsequent study relies -among others -on dictator experiments with incomplete information (Guth and Huck, in press).
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To see why this regularity is quite natural assume that both X-types, i.e. an X with c = c and an X with c = c, offer 3_ to Y and Z: clearly, for X with c = e the share on offer is o034 %0 whereas the corresponding share for X with c = c is o-67 %0 which is nearly twice as high.
Given these observations Y-players who face offers which would be fair if the cake were small should be very suspicious. One might even expect that Y would reject offers x with 8-40 > x >? 8-oo and accepts lower ones. This is, however, not supported by our data.
Let us now turn to the question of how decision preparation influenced the X-players. The main effect of the pre-experimental questionnaire is expressed by BEHAVIOURAL REGULARITY 3. The offers of players X with large cakes are significantly higher in session III than in session I.
We tested the hypothesis for the first rounds with the one-tailed MWU-test (n = IO, a = 0o02).1O It may seem surprising that a questionnaire structured to induce backward induction did not trigger gamesmanship but more generous offers. Becoming more familiar with a decision problem may also discourage strategic thinking and induce a search for socially acceptable solutions since considerations of backward induction make one think about others and how they might feel. One can conjecture that thinking about the other party's position has two countervailing effects: on the one hand, it may encourage subjects to engage in backward induction, i.e., making them less generous. On the other hand, it could lead to an emphatic perspective -putting oneself in the other party's shoes -and thus promote generosity. Given that it, in fact, promoted generous offers, perhaps the latter effect of the questionnaire was stronger than the former.
The change from cell I to cell III of Table I suggests BEHAVIOURAL REGULARITY 4. The auction bids of potential players X are smaller in session IV than in session II.
Since subjects had to fill out the pre-experimental questionnaire first and then bid, the questionnaire should trigger concerns for Y and Z, and the expected value of becoming player X -and therefore the bid for role X -should decrease. We tested this hypothesis for the bids of the first rounds, and it was significantly validated (one-tailed MWU-test, n = 20, ac = o0os). With respect to I's rejection behaviour three observations seem worth mentioning: first, offers x with x > 8-4o are never rejected. Secondly, offers x with 8-40 > x > 8&oo are only rejected in 3 out of 22 cases, i.e. pretended fairness is quite successful. Thirdly, for offers x with x < 8&oo the probability of rejection increases dramatically to 35 00 We can sum up these observations by BEHAVIOURAL REGULARITY 6. When it becomes obvious to Y that X has not offered a fair share, i.e. when x < 8&oo, the frequency of rejection increases dramatically.
Regularities 2 and 6 together imply that for small cakes bargaining more often ends in conflict than it does for large cakes.
Concerning the effects of the 2 X 2-design (Table I) 
